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
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STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

MAJ. ROLAND W. FLEMING, JR.
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT OF COMMUNIST
IDEOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO POLITICAL
CONTROL IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
-1975-

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⑥ A PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT OF COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

⑨ Student research report

⑫ 52p.

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FOREWORD

This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of Phase III Training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

Only unclassified sources are used in producing the research paper. The opinions, value judgments and conclusions expressed are those of the author and in no way reflect official policy of the United States Government; Department of Defense; Department of the Army; Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence; or the United States Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies.

Interested readers are invited to send their comments to the Commander of the Institute:

RICHARD P. KELLY
TC, MI
Commander

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SUMMARY

In this paper the author studies the psychological effects of Communist ideology and observes them in relationship to political control in the Soviet Armed Forces. Basic ideological principles are identified in this totalitarian type political system. The Armed Forces are considered a reflection of society where perpetuating organs continue to foster ideological concepts. Measures for influencing attitudes are shown to contribute toward discipline. Shortcomings in individual servicemen may provide a potential for limited control problems, but the author believes that the means for enforcing ideology will ensure the continuance of political control in the Soviet Armed Forces.

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A PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT OF COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE SOVIET
ARMED FORCES

The effectiveness of an Armed Force is determined by the united efforts of its members. Conviction in the goals of the government it supports, belief in its military leaders, superior training, and first-rate weaponry all contribute to its combat readiness and to the resultant level of performance. Loyalty of an Armed Force is predicated upon its allegiance to a set doctrine and to its adherence to a unified structure. Such an allegiance is readily observable in the Soviet Armed Forces. In order to develop an understanding of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, it is necessary to pursue the psychological effects of Communist ideology and to observe them in relationship to political control. Communist ideology may be said to affect the state of mind of its citizenry and thereby control the behavior of its masses. The Soviet Armed Forces are, in reality, a continuing step in the education of the Soviet population and in the control of Soviet citizenry's thoughts. The educational process of convincing the Soviet citizenry in the rightness of the Communist political system and in demanding loyalty to Communist doctrines never ceases. Of interest in this

paper is the means by which the Soviet Union goes about ensuring that its Armed Forces will continue to react as the guarantor of the Communist political system within the boundaries of the Soviet Union, and as a vehicle for Soviet influence and expansion throughout the world.

Before examining any psychological effects of ideology and their relationship to political control in the Soviet Armed Forces, certain assumptions need to be stated. In the Soviet Armed Forces, policies, training, and control emanate, directly and indirectly, from the guidance provided by the edicts of the Politburo (Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party). Such a centralized source ensures an identifiable pattern of response by those who adhere to its directives. Another assumption which readily supports the hypothesis that psychological effects of Communist ideology enhance the effectiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces, relates to the concept of the Soviet man. Over the years the Soviet Armed Forces has altered its view of the psychological makeup of the Soviet man to correspond with the Soviet conception of what constitutes proper behavioral attitudes within its political system (as dictated by the Communist Party apparatus).

These two foregoing assumptions provide a basis for a look into Communist society. A short glance into

the history of communism will assist in establishing the setting in which psychological attitudes have developed. The 1917 Revolution represented a radical alteration from the bourgeoisie way of thinking. A new social order was born. The Marxist-Leninist way of thinking offered, in the eyes of the Communists, the true scientific reflection of reality, the ideology of the overwhelming majority of mankind. With new-found influence, the Soviet Union foresaw world conquest by means of changing social concepts, with all nations subjugated to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The individual in Soviet society experienced innundations of propaganda directed at creating belief in one social structure. That which was not Communist was to be hated. No peaceful coexistence was possible since capitalism and scientific socialism reflected two opposing and irreconcilable economic and social systems. In the eyes of the Communists, "only Marxism-Leninism represents the ideas and aims of all workers, that it alone is non-oppressive and has no need to rationalize, and that the Communist Party alone is armed with the laws of social development uncovered by Marx and Engels and so it alone can scientifically guide society's development."¹

Basic doctrines of the Soviet Communist Party have become dogmatized and accepted as proven, even without rational proof. Some are held on faith or on authority. Others can be neither proven nor disproven. The most important doctrines of Communist ideology include the

following: only matter exists, reality is essentially dialectical, communism's triumph is inevitable, the aims of working mankind have become the aims of communism, and the Party as vanguard of mankind will lead it to communism. Since a new society is inevitable, a New Soviet Man will live in it. Therefore, the new society will require special education and propaganda to help the new man adjust to the new life. Communism's moral imperative is represented by its belief that communism is the aim of mankind. Correspondingly, the Party is the vanguard of the proletariat, which will lead and protect mankind in its quest for a new life.

Ideology of communism is the ideology of the ruling Communist Party. The ideas of the rulers determine the ideals, goals, and ends of the new society. Citizens must prefer the good of society above their own good. The leaders decide what is to be achieved and how it will be done. In the past, terror and force were even used. But, the main effect of winning the minds of people lies in the realm of ideology. Since the 1950's, an emphasis on moral re-education has been in effect to offset the trend of Stalinist violence. The instillment of Communist values into society and the conscious acceptance of the ends of communism by society have been a prime goal of the Soviet Union's leaders. Under the re-education system more effective means for inculcating Communist values have steadily increased. Writers, artists, educators, philosophers,

social psychologists, all have been encouraged to formulate and mold public opinion as a means of social control. Supposedly, the more internalized this ideological indoctrination becomes, the greater the obedience and the greater the conscious belief. As society becomes more convinced of its new-found rightness, the more actively it will strive to build the Communist society and the more dedicated it will struggle to defeat the immoral and oppressive capitalist states. Thus, the Communist Party attempts to create an ideology that will transform its followers into a society of the future, divesting itself from all non-related forms of ideology.

Having committed themselves to the destruction of Russia's pre-revolutionary society and of capitalism, Communist leaders must continue to interpret the ideology of Marxism-Leninism to the generations that have known no other political system or way of life. These leaders must continue advocating belief in the ultimate achievement of communism. In the words of Richard T. DeGeorge in his survey of Soviet philosophy, Patterns of Soviet Thought, for the generations who have had their patterns of thought centered upon Marxism-Leninism since childhood "to give up their belief or hope would be to live in a void, with no answers or with complete and thorough-going skepticism--an alternative which few in any society could tolerate."² This statement suggests that the values of Soviet society will, in essence, continue to reflect those ideological

beliefs espoused by the Soviet Communist Party.

Having identified those basic principles that communism holds dear, a review of the type political system currently found in the Soviet Union will add to the setting that contributes to the formation of psychological attitudes, which a young man entering the Soviet Armed Forces may be expected to possess. The type political system that most lucidly identifies the Soviet Union is totalitarian, illustrated by its totalitarianism of social organizations and of governmental technique. Centralization of control in this type political system inherently raises the power of those in leadership positions while expression of individualism within the masses recedes. Certain characteristics become a part of the totalitarian state. The Soviet Union displays them as follows: the infallible leader who can make no mistakes, who cannot be criticized, and who can justify himself by rewriting history; the disciplined party, which comes to power through revolution, imposes its will upon the masses, integrates the whole population into the regime, and leaves no room for opposition to exist; the political spirit that everything is for the state, wherein the state is nationalistic, belligerent to opposing ideologies, and justifies its control over the individual's life and thought; the legal use of violence and terror through arbitrary arrest and repression by political police; the use of mass propaganda to suppress oppositional ideas, to dictate what should be said, and which leads to unlimited control over

thought and culture; a vast potential for totalitarian control due to modern means of mass transportation, mass communications, record-keeping facilities and modern armaments.³

A kind of thought control becomes apparent when evaluating the above characteristics. By controlling the mass media, the state can actively create the content of what it wants the nation to think and directly impose these ideas upon the listeners. Criticism and opposition are more easily handled when political police may unrestrictedly suppress individuals who do not agree with policies of the regime. As acceptance of and belief in the state doctrine is obligatory, the state may concentrate mass media resources and strive to fashion a society which is amenable to suggestion and control. The potential psychological effect of this totalitarian use of communications is interesting. The limited number of people who dominate the media manipulate audiences for ulterior purposes. Their ultimate objective would seem to be to stimulate emotional responses within the people which would make them intense believers of Communist doctrine. Finally, thought control reaches saturation when the populace accepts without question the reinterpretation of a Communist doctrine, which is brought about by a need to support whatever policy is most opportune at a given moment. Such instances occur when the leadership tries to bridge a gap between doctrine and reality. The entire structure of totalitarianism and its related centralization of thought leads to one concept--that the Party is the nation's mind.

Within the totalitarian structure of the Soviet Union, society has its own general order. This order provides an insight into what an inductee has experienced prior to service life. Everything that is officially taught, printed, and stated in public must conform to the Party line; it must aim to further the power and policies of the Party and its leadership. In effect, "communism is a unitary, all-embracing and absolute system."⁴ It is an internally coherent and comprehensive system of social thought, which stresses politization of all aspects of life. That is, communism subjects all thought to strict political standards. It holds that every human activity has political significance and it judges everything in terms of its political impact. By means of such ideology, the Soviet Union hopes to create a new thought process in man. The chief weapons of indoctrination are literature, cultural programs, the press, and education. A single point of view is sought which seeks a "definite, systematic, and mass indoctrination of the minds of men to trust only the Party. Truth becomes what a group of men say it is."⁵

Examples of several tasks of society illustrate the type of truths that the Party wants its citizens to incorporate. These tasks are readily identifiable in articles printed in newspapers. Several of them are as follows:

(1) Intensification of the ideological struggle - the task is "to evaluate social phenomena from positions of Marxism-Lenini to uphold principles of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism in practice, to propagate the Soviet way of life..."⁶

(2) The system - the task is included in the statements, "We Soviet people love and value the Soviet system. We devote all our thoughts and efforts to its strengthening."⁷

(3) Party committee - its task "is to create an effective, prospective reserve of ideological cadres."⁸

(4) International education - the task is to strengthen in every person a "sense of a single family, of the internationalism of ideas..."⁹

(5) Versus the bourgeoisie - the task is to use "scientific courses for the purpose of developing Leninist ideological convictions in youngsters, convictions which enable (condition) Soviet man and make him an active fighter, tempered and unshakeable in his struggle against bourgeoisie ideology..."¹⁰

(6) Intelligentsia - the task is to "actively assist the Party in shaping the world outlook of the new man."¹¹

(7) Schools - their tasks are "to make certain that every school child holds our Soviet Homeland and the friendship of peoples as sacred, that the struggle for the happiness of the people, for communism, becomes the most fervent desire of every young patriot, and that nobility and courage, lucid wisdom and industriousness, and irreconcilability toward anything hostile to Communist ideals becomes the norm of

every youngster's life..."¹²

(8) School cadres - their tasks are "to master theory, party policy and the scientific foundations of party propaganda"¹³

(9) Pupils - the task is "to raise children in the best revolutionary, fighting, and labor traditions of the Soviet people"¹⁴ and to show them "the future prospects of Communist construction, the labor heroism of the people."¹⁵

Such goals stress politization of life.

Such an atmosphere prevails within the boundaries of the Soviet Homeland, forming a set pattern of attitudes among its populace.

If such a social order appears to be so omnipresent and if the government would seem to be in such a favorable position to dictate the subservience of its peoples, the need for such a huge standing Armed Force should be questionable. Ideologically, psychologically, and rationally the need does exist. Ideologically, the Communists feel the need to protect the gains of their revolution and the cause of socialism from the opposing social system of capitalism. Psychologically, the large modernized Armed Force places the Soviet Union on an equal basis with the world super-powers and reduces the possibility of being invaded, and subsequently being dominated by a foreign nation. Rationally, the Armed Forces, which are under the direction of the Communist Party, provide the means for the Party to

remain in control over its peoples and to expand its influence throughout the world. The basic needs for the Soviet Armed Forces appear essentially to be for internal control and to conduct an aggressive foreign policy. The Party immediately directs the military establishment, determines its policy, and exercises control over its implementation. Commanders, with few exceptions, are Party members, who represent the Communist Party as well as the Soviet Government, and who are duty bound to fulfill the orders, directives, and instructions from above. Thus, reliability of the Armed Forces is assured.

Strong appeals are directed at the average servicemen in an effort to solidify their continued loyalty. Slogans such as "defense of the Socialist Motherland is the sacred duty of each citizen" and "Party political work contributes to...friendship of the peoples and proletarian internationalism in the spirit of high revolutionary vigilance and hatred for imperialism" may continually be heard or read.¹⁶ The Armed Forces are thus kept at a high level of preparedness for the eventuality of a "defensive war against the antagonistic forces of imperialism. The Soviets envisage that victory depends on readiness and ability to finish war in the shortest possible time. A sustained war is possible, but would be affected by the country's economy and by the people's morale."¹⁷

The first portion of this paper is intended to show that the inductee entering the Soviet Armed Forces does not come to his new occupation with a blank background. He has instead been influenced in his earlier years by psychologically oriented attitudes - attitudes resultant of an identifiable social, economic, and political theory. The recruit would normally exhibit a knowledge of Communist ideology and already demonstrate a loyalty to the totalitarian type of governing system. He should realize the need for the Soviet Armed Forces and the need for his participation in them. Service in the Soviet Armed Forces would then seem to be simply an extension of Soviet society's educational system, not totally unfamiliar to the young recruit.

To be successful, any organization must accomplish its set goals. The goals must motivate the people concerned and unite them in a common effort. The Soviet Armed Forces find it imperative that its soldiers be aware of and identify the objectives of the society in which they live. The Soviets recognize that their soldier is not unlike any other soldier. He must feel that he is doing something important. And in the Soviet society, the Communist Party insures that the soldier's attentions are directed toward the "constant awareness that he is doing something important for the peoples of his country (collective security within the Soviet Union) and the entire world (in pursuit of international socialism)." ¹⁸ (Encls by the author).

Based upon the assumption that Soviet ideology and political control invade all realms of social order, it may be assumed that the serviceman will discover in the Armed Forces an ideology similar to that which he had known in civilian life. Therefore, the inductee's state of mind will undoubtedly reflect socialist morality and aspirations. Perhaps his outlook, as he enters the Armed Forces, may succinctly be described in a few sentences. Student years are a time for enrichment in general information and in forming a Marxist-Leninist outlook. Useful social work advances the socialist way of life. An individual must transform the Communist moral code into his inner convictions if he is to contribute his share in building communism. Socialism is inevitable. The danger of war is a grim reality. The Soviet Armed Forces is an invincible power. The Armed Forces are a part of the people.¹⁹

Psychologically, the soldier cannot be divorced from his sense of belonging to society. The Armed Forces succeed in establishing ideological relationships between the two groupings. Constant stress is placed upon the study of the psychology of each man (the personal touch) with the purpose of re-educating mistaken ideas (shaping of opinion) and of improving cohesiveness in units. Military ideas of loyalty parallel those of civilians, i.e., loyalty to the Socialist Homeland, collectivism, humanism, and irreconcilability with the country's enemies. The Armed Forces Regulations are based upon the way society understands

the notions of good, justice, honor, dignity, and duty. Socialist emulation is found equally in civil life and in the services, which means that servicemen strive to achieve the highest results in any undertaking and not be satisfied with merely fulfilling the ordinary service requirements. And, of course, "collectivism is one of the most important features of Soviet servicemen" as well as of society, in general.²⁰ The soldier indeed realizes his role in society when his leaders describe him as follows:

"The young Soviet soldier does not conceive his personal happiness in isolation from the happiness of his people. He thinks of work for the good of his country, for the sake of building the most just society - Communism."²¹

Psychologically instilled ideas, originated in civilian life, are carried into the Armed Forces. They become expanded and reinforced during the period of service. This fact portrays the Armed Forces as a vehicle for extending government influence and depicts it as a means for implementation of government policy. Tasks assigned to servicemen promote Communist ideology and political control. Tasks of "molding a staunch and conscious defender of the socialist homeland" and of educating a citizen patriot, an active builder of Communist society" are assigned "by (both) the Party and (the) people."²² By implementing these tasks, the serviceman becomes both a patriot and an internationalist. Establishment of socialist truth through propagandizing is thought to develop political consciousness. Once the serviceman

recognizes that there can be no compromise in the field of ideology, the serviceman will be willing to lay his life down for the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Living and serving by strict observance of military laws and regulations enforce discipline and guarantee correct behavior. All of the above ideas serve to strengthen the Party's hand in fortifying its psychological as well as physical hold on society.

The need for an Armed Force remains uncontestable. In words attributed to V.I. Lenin, "No revolution is worth anything unless it can defend itself."²³ However, the communists contend that the historic purpose of their Armed Forces is totally different from previous and contemporary non-Communist Armed Forces. The Soviet Armed Forces is said to be the "defender of everything advanced and progressive against the forces of reaction and aggression,"²⁴ which is construed to mean that the Armed Forces are an instrument of defense of the working people's interests and of achievements of the socialist system. Its aims include the release of all humanity from all exploitation, the end of war on earth, and the movement of society along the path of progress conforming to the thoughts and expectations of the working people. Without the guiding influence of the Party, ideological work in the Armed Forces would presumably be inconclusive. The Communists recognize that the effectiveness of influencing people depends on the psychological state of the person. Unless advice does not

concur with what is learned through experience in personal life, the results will be negative. Therefore, the Party surrounds its citizens in family life, in school, and at work, as it does in the military, with socialist ideology in an effort to form socialist ideas and moods.²⁵ In essence, the process of coordinating ideological doctrines with daily influences of life displays an elementary and practical understanding of the effects of psychology on human behavior.

Soviet society and its Armed Forces, though they purport to be peace-loving in nature, instead, seem to be militaristic. Society places emphasis upon huge military forces, concentrates the economy upon a military preparedness status, and promotes self-proclaimed superior values. The Soviet Armed Forces ensure the security of the Soviet state, ensure the security of the entire socialist community, and objectively promote revolutionary and liberation movements. Military duty enjoys the distinction that such duty fulfills the will of the people. In respect to militarism, the Armed Forces are a reflection of Communist society.²⁶ Instilling this attitude is a never-ending process characterized by constant propagandizing.

The foregoing portion of this paper displays a definite correlation of ideological concepts inherent in civilian life and in the Armed Forces. Life in the service will continue to foster Communist doctrine. The Communist Party will manipulate the psychology of the individual in an

attempt to instill automatic responses of belief and devotion. Further discussion will center upon the processes of implementing doctrine within the Armed Forces, followed by an analysis of whether or not the psychological process of political control is successful.

To safeguard its political position in the Armed Forces, the Communist Party instills political education through the Chief Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy (this office functions as a Deputy to the CPSU Central Committee). Subordinate Political Departments operate in Military Districts. Each formation has its Political Section. Units have Deputy Commanders for Political Affairs who are assisted by CPSU committees, bureaus and Komsomol organizations.²⁷ Additional means of controlling political thought include the Military Political Administration (GPU) under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and special sections under the Ministry for State Security (KGB).

By observing these organizations, the reader will notice that a serviceman finds himself overcome by the attention given to political control. He will realize that a wide range of psychological means - persuasion, recognition, criticism, disciplinary restrictions, threats, and others - are used to formulate opinions and behavior in the name of discipline. Almost no time is left for personal thoughts. Daily activities, structured in detail, run from early morning until late in the evening. Almost every activity occurs with a purpose. Normally, one of the

organizations mentioned above is responsible for administration of the activities. Normally, the great majority of responsible persons in charge will be members of the Communist Party or the All-Union Lenin Young Communist League (Komsomol). And, normally, these personnel are highly motivated. Their motivation results from the belief that "if you are a Communist, it is your duty to be an example at all times and in all things."²⁸ For them, no higher honor exists and no responsibility is greater than to labor for the sake of communism. The Party is their mind, honor, and conscience. It is difficult to perceive that one's attitude could go unaffected by such constant exposure to dedicated individuals, especially if the devotees were to practice psychological methodology in their appeals and rationalizations.

The inference of Communist ideology and doctrine into the minds of Soviet servicemen may best be represented by a more detailed identification of those organizations and individuals who are most responsible for propagating ideas. Such designation will show how political control becomes common practice.

The Communist Party may be considered the most important control apparatus in the Armed Forces. Approximately 20% of the total Armed Forces are members of the Party and over 60% belong to the Komsomol. Over 90% of the officers are Communist Party and Komsomol members. • A Communist Party cell organization is required where three or more Communists

are employed. The company is the lowest level where such a Party organization is normally found. Each succeeding higher echelon forms its Party organization by drawing on the Party members who compose the higher staff plus delegates from lower Party organizations.²⁹

Marshal A. A. Grechko, Minister of Defense, Soviet Union, states that within the pedagogical collective for education of the troops, the officer/commander is the decisive link in the educational-training process. His ideological convictions, political consciousness, and political and social activity provide the authority and leadership required to implement political education.³⁰

Another important figure, who works in conjunction with the unit commander, is the political officer. As the deputy commander, he is responsible for the political reliability and political training of the unit. He is considered the Party's eyes and ears in the Army as he continually informs the Party of unit morale and attitudes. With the application of history, pedagogy, philosophy, psychology, party-political work, and military tactics, he becomes the serviceman's best friend. No sphere of military training, service to country, or life go beyond his expertise.³¹

Komsomol members purportedly work, fight for, and implement Lenin's precepts. They are considered outstanding young men with correct idealism. Over 50% demonstrate their leadership by receiving the distinction of excelling in both political and battle training. They usually are

better read and educated on general and political matters than their colleagues. As young leaders, these individuals usually receive leadership positions in their units and are called upon by the commander to help discipline their comrades in military and political affairs and attitudes. Membership in the Komsomol enhances a serviceman's promotion and assignment potential, directing the more dedicated into careers as political officers and assistants or as intelligence specialists.³²

An important link in the control chain is the organization that is military in form and political in character. The Main Political Administration (GPU) is part of the military arm of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Its seven sections provide intelligence-trained personnel for assignment within the formal military-political apparatus (See Annexes A, B, and C).³³ The trained GPU member is assigned to a military unit either as an overt GPU member acting as a political officer or assistant, a propagandist, or club director, or he may be assigned in a covert status to work as a member of the Information Section. In either case he would be an overt Party or Komsomol member and would participate in all Party and Komsomol activities. If he were an overt GPU member, his duties would correspond to his duty assignment. As a covert agent, he would most likely be part of the agent network required to obtain the information needed by higher echelons of the GPU.

A larger, more pervasive, and more powerful agency, known as the Committee for State Security (KGB), induces its special sections and operatives into the Soviet Armed Forces. Both it and the GPU receive directives from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The KGB acts as a secret control element in the Armed Forces and possesses an hierarchy entirely independent of the military chain of command and of the political officers. Every military formation, institution, or installation, from the highest level in the Soviet Armed Forces to the lowest elements, has attached to it a special section or an operative. The functions of these special sections and operatives include surveillance of all military personnel, supervision of all aspects of military life, conduct of secret police operations, conduct of counterintelligence activities, control of all military warehouses and stockpiles, and control over all reconnaissance operations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Officially, the KGB has the mission to combat espionage in the Armed Forces. In actual practice, it directs its efforts against military personnel, regardless of their rank and position and regardless of their Party or non-Party activities. It creates and organizes nets of agent-informants from military personnel and agitators in all troop units, in all headquarters and headquarters sections, in all military administrations and military sections, in the Ministry of Defense and others. These agent-informants consist of soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers,

who secretly observe everything. At least one of these informants may be found in a unit or section. Normally, the number of informants amounts to three percent of the unit strength.³⁴

Implementation of political ideology requires an execution process. In the Soviet Armed Forces several perpetuating organs visibly provide the means for political control. Communist Party organizations, officers/commanders political officers, and Komsomol groups overtly promote greater adherence to socialist ideals. Psychological appeals to the servicemen reflect an atmosphere of "rally-round-the-flag", because as leaders of the proletariat, they, as communists, know what is best. An opposite form of psychological appeal is represented by the GPU, KGB, and informants. These organs overtly and covertly suggest the sense of fear. Because their presence is pervasive, and no one is excluded from their never-ending suspicion or investigation, servicemen tend to inhibit individualism and mouth allegiance to Party doctrine. Having identified these organs as the instruments most significant in shaping attitudes, insight will now be given to the effectiveness of control by discussing measures used for influencing attitudes.

Central in forming attitudes is the idea that a military unit can do its work well only if its activity is based on collectivism. Mission orientation reigns high in all military camps, but under communism the notion of collectivism represents an extension of cultural life. By accentuating subordination of individualism to the will

of the collective, Communist ideology suggests that the individual will turn his energies to more useful purposes. The feeling of responsibility toward the entire collective will not only get the job done, but will guarantee the support and respect of comrades. From the point of view of leadership, more can be accomplished if the psychological atmosphere in an element is right. To the Communist, greater efficiency occurs "if the collective lives and works in a serious, business-like atmosphere. It is easier to instill in the men a responsible attitude towards service, duty and military order."³⁵

Criticism plays an important part in formulating proper attitudes. Not only are servicemen publicly acknowledged for outstanding work in unit newssheets and meetings, they likewise come under direct criticism for inefficient contributions to the collective. Peer pressure, generally speaking, influences a serviceman in a positive manner and forces him to realize that the collective will not leave him alone until he changes his behavior to accepted norms. Discipline of superiors may also be criticized if personal habits require improvement. However, "the order of the superior is a law for the subordinate. The order must be executed unquestionably, accurately and on time."³⁶ Thus, no one escapes "constructive" criticism.

The method of persuasion is highly regarded in assisting the person-in-charge in winning the confidence of his

subordinates. The leader can feel his way into the mind of the serviceman through words and deeds. Personal interest in the individual and personal example by the instructor supplement the high standards placed before the serviceman as contained in manuals and regulations. Especially influential in the life of a Soviet soldier is his taking of the Military Oath.³⁷ Taken seriously, the contents of the oath place a great and serious responsibility upon the serviceman to defend his Motherland (love of country). The oath, in effect, subordinates his will to the interests and dictates of the ruling political power (The Communist Party) and to its continuing position of control. The Soviets realize the value of persuasion for they remark that men respond to those whom they admire and respect. If officers and political leaders master the art of persuasion, then they will benefit both themselves for enlisting the voluntary support of their subordinates, and the Communist Party for demonstrating the effectiveness of Communist morality and ideology.

The spirit of Communist awareness is presented in cycles of lectures, political groups, political reports, discussions (of new books, articles, films), seminars, unit meetings, Lenin studies, question and answer sessions, quizzes, newspapers, theatres, films, and study rooms. Combat Glory rooms hand down traditions. Even all officers and generals engage in Marxism-Leninism studies so they can maintain perspectives. Any and all means of educational

activities are used to emanate mass propaganda.³⁸

People somehow find it necessary to be recognized for their achievements. The Soviets realize this psychological need in the human being and gladly oblige the inherent desire. Awards, medals, photographs, announcements in printed media, and radio and television exposure are all used to bolster recognition.³⁹ Heroes abound. People seem to respond eagerly to this simplistic stimulation. Of course, the more achievements that a serviceman obtains indicates that he is loyal, capable and trustworthy. And, these leadership qualities would seem to indicate a potential for social mobility and betterment of one's life. No longer is discipline in Soviet society, to include the Armed Forces, based primarily on the use of force. Coercion and punishment remain important in ensuring discipline among the servicemen. Directives state that use of coercion should be secondary to persuasion. Coercion is a method which is applied to the insignificant minority of servicemen who, not being sufficiently conscious politically, commit disciplinary offenses and in that manner hamper efforts to enhance combat readiness of units.

The fundamental aim of punishment is to cultivate discipline. When other attempts to re-educate a serviceman fail, punishment is justified. Intolerance of violations and desire for strict discipline will never rule out the requirement for harsher methods of keeping order. The Armed Forces strive for the "correct combination of persuasion and force."⁴⁰

The process of formulating attitudes favorable for good discipline begins with the serviceman's knowledge that service in the Soviet Armed Forces is an exalted and honorable duty of the Soviet citizen, as guaranteed by Article 132 of the Constitution of the Soviet Union.⁴¹ Added to this realization is the unending process of propagandizing of Communist ideals and ethical principles. Continued development of proper ideological and political perspectives is a responsibility of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Armed Forces implement various measures for influencing attitudes. The measures for influencing attitudes - collectivism, criticism, persuasion, education, recognition, coercion, and force - contribute toward discipline. Discipline contributes to control. And control implies command over the mind of the individual. The goal of discipline involves carrying out superiors' orders and instructions unquestionably, faultlessly, and punctually. Thus positive motivational factors and disciplinary measures just described theoretically imply the potential for successful control within the Soviet Armed Forces.

In reality, theoretical potential does not always yield the desired results. The Soviet serviceman, being human and not always being predictable, complicates attempts for strict political control. Deficiencies do exist in his character. Despite the continual barrage of what should be done and despite the illusion that all should be well within the Soviet Armed Forces, as an uninformed observer would

superficially think, scrutinization of the newspaper "Red Star" (organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union), for the period September through December, 1974, shows that character inconsistencies have the potential to influence the capabilities, readiness, and effectiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces. The inefficiencies illustrate the problems that the Soviet military leaders face.

Among the varied shortcomings found in the newspaper analysis are the following, which include all levels of the military strata: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union needs to pay more strict attention during selection of those officers who will best carry forward the objectives of the Communist Party. The Ministry of Defense needs to improve the quality of instruction in those military schools that do not educate students properly. Communist Party organizations in the military face the necessity to raise the level of poor leadership among the military cadre. Old methods, weak stimuli, and non-purposeful activities signify inattention by the Party organizations. Some Komsomol members are not active in political education, while others participate in criminal activities. Inadequate discipline, negligence, hidden violations, weak leadership, low-caliber training, and not using Party and Komsomol organizations properly represent failings of officers. Young officers are more likely to need disciplinary action, plus they do not fully understand the significance of applying

Party-political information. Political officers and propagandists are criticized for poor leadership, no motivation, too little Party-political work, and non-employment of self-criticism in units. In some units, one out of three soldiers did not fulfill their socialist responsibilities. Their weaknesses include sloppy work, inattention, idleness, and non-desire to follow the demands of a commander. Some soldiers bring their religious beliefs into the service, and the units to which they are assigned neglect to adequately re-educate them.⁴²

If the Ukrainian Republic is representative of the Soviet Union, fifty percent of all crimes are committed by the under 30-age group. Approximately twenty percent of all crimes are committed by unemployed youths. It may be assumed that a representative number of these young people enter the Armed Forces who contribute to the problems just mentioned. The primary reason for their non-social behavior is given as bad family upbringing and abnormal relations in the family. Servicemen with this type background would require a great deal of re-education to effectively fit into the military commune.⁴³

It seems that classification of the noted deficiencies can best be described as "human failings." The shortcomings are general in nature, common to those found in non-Communist Armed Forces. Selection of poor quality leaders, poor methods of instruction, non-participation, negligence, inattention, disobeying of orders and like

problems, do not intimate serious deficiencies in the Armed Forces, unless they occur in excessiveness. The problems here appear not to be in ideological theory, but in the carrying out of responsibilities. While no great wave of inefficiencies (based upon content of the above purview) appears to threaten the smooth functioning of the Soviet Armed Forces, or its continued existence, there are enough examples to indicate that not all is as the leaders would have it be; that similar problems exist in more than one locale, and that the individual officer and/or soldier possesses and displays attitudes that do not reflect the highest of socialist values (some even appear uninfluenced by Communist doctrine). It is noted that the authors of the articles do not criticize the structure of the military or political system. Criticism is limited to those individuals who do not do their part. It is possible to surmise that while a well-structured command system prevails, the capabilities of individuals, or the lack thereof, plus independent thought, will continue to cause the types of problems as listed.

The effects of political control within the Soviet Armed Forces are successful. Historically, the Soviet peoples have been subjected to a single ruler or ruling power. The basic desire to continue to exist, to simply live, carries them through untold suffering. The modern totalitarian system controls their existence to such a degree that individuality is almost an impossible act.

In fact, individuality must be subjected to the will of the collective. All aspects of society are directed toward fulfillment of the directives of the Communist Party, which intends to create a completely new society. Political control remains omnipresent. The Soviet Armed Forces bases discipline on subservience to Communist Party directives and implements it on the will of the collective. Though the system proposes that discipline be effected primarily by persuasion, this does not mean that the system is becoming less severe or less demanding. Fear of purges, fear of punishment, and use of force remain primary tools of enforcing discipline whenever the occasion might suit the controlling power. Realizing that servicemen are easier to control when they feel they are doing something worthwhile and something in which they believe, the Soviets prefer to continue their methods of constant propagandizing. They acknowledge the fact that certain individuals will not conduct themselves properly. These deficiencies in servicemen allow the vanguard to implement various psychological pressures in the struggle for conquest of the individual's will. The Soviet Armed Forces appear to be functioning adequately. Their position as a super-power in world affairs strengthens the conviction that their ideology and methodology are correct. Based upon the information available, it appears that wherever Communist ideology may seem to be ineffective among servicemen, an appropriate


psychological pressure will be found to correct the deficiency. This conclusion is formulated because, in essence, the political system within the Soviet Union has proven that any and all means are justified to alter behavior in the drive for world supremacy.

GPU FUNCTIONS

1. AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA SECTION: Responsible for preparing material for propaganda posters, discussions and agitation activities.
2. PARTY ORGANIZATION SECTION: Directs Party and Komsomol activities in the military; responsible for passing on official Party directives through the military channels; responsible for monitoring unit activities for their proper "spirit"; ensures that each Party organization and Komsomol group does its fair share of Party work.
3. ORGANIZATIONAL AND INSTRUCTOR SECTION: Determines the personnel requirements for the unit political apparatus.
4. CULTURE AND EDUCATION SECTION: Provides cultural events (folk dances, plays, etc.) with the proper spirit; recommends selected literature for discussion at meetings.
5. INFORMATION SECTION: Responsible for collecting information about the true morale and training status of each unit. (This information is passed on to higher echelons without any change or whitewash, for this appears to be the only method by which the leadership can feel the true pulse of the population in a land where the normal means - elections, free press, and open debate - are not available).
6. CADRE SECTION: Trains the personnel selected for the GPU in preparation for their service in the military units.
7. ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC SECTION: Provides the basic GPU administration and logistical support for all of the other sections.

ANNEX A

REGIMENTAL G.P.U. POLITICAL-MILITARY CONTROL & SERVICE, REGIMENTAL LEVEL



RESPONSIBILITIES OF GPU POLITICAL-MILITARY CONTROL PERSONNEL

The Regimental Political Officer -- zampolit (Zamestitel' Politiki - Deputy for Political Affairs) is responsible for the regimental Party organization with its subordinate battalion and company organizations. The secretary of the regimental Komsomol organization, with its subordinate battalion and company Komsomol organizations, is responsible to the regimental political officer. The battalion and company political officers are also subordinate to the regimental zampolit. The regimental zampolit additionally has a club director and librarian at his disposal. The club is where political discussions, cultural, and educational events and Party meetings are often held. The librarian is responsible for upkeep of the library and ensures that all of the "necessary" literature is present. Battalions and companies may have their own clubs and libraries, but their upkeep is normally the responsibility of the unit Party and Komsomol organizations and the political officer. The regimental zampolit also has at his disposal a trained propagandist/agitator who is responsible for distributing propaganda, consulting with the Party and Komsomol organizations about propaganda and agitation, and, in conjunction with the club director and librarian, programming cultural and educational events that serve a propaganda purpose.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Richard T. DeGeorge, Patterns of Soviet Thought (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, The University of Michigan Press, 1970) p. 229.

² Ibid., p. 245.

³ Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism (New York: Vintage Books, 1962) pp. 282-314.

⁴ J. Edgar Hoover, Masters of Deceit (New York: Pocket Books, Incorporated, 1958) p. 161.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 156-157.

⁶ "Ideological Tempering of Intelligentsia Viewed as Key Concern," Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, XVIII, No. 11 (November, 1974), p. 12. Excerpt from "Rearing and Educating Ideological Cadres, from the Meeting of the Ideological Workers' Aktiv of the Republic Party Organization," Radyans'ka Ukraina, October 9, 1974, pp. 2-3.

⁷ "Predvybornye Sobraniia Trudiaschchikhsia Pod Znamenem Nerushmogo Edinstva Vstrecha Izbiratelei s lu. V. Andropovym" (Election Campaign Meetings of the Working People: Under the Banner of Indestructible Unity - Voters Meet with Yury V. Andropov), Pravda, June 6, 1974, p. 2.

⁸ "Shcherbyts'kyi Speech to Ideological Workers," Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, XVIII, No. 11 (November, 1974), p. 13. Excerpt from "Raising the Effectiveness of Ideo-Educational work, Address by Comrade V. V. Shcherbyts'kyi at the Meeting of the Ideological Workers' Aktiv of the Republic's Party Organization on October 4, 1974," Radyans'ka Ukraina, October 9, 1974, pp. 2-3.

⁹ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁰ "Role of Teachers in Ideological Education Stressed," Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, XVIII, No. 11 (November, 1974), p. 26. Excerpt from "Fighters on the Ideological Front," Radyans'ka Osvita, September 14, 1974, p. 1.

¹¹ Pg. 12 "Ideological Tempering of Intelligentsia Viewed as Key Concern,

¹² Pg. 25 "Role of Teachers in Ideological Education Stressed,"

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ "Shkol'niki i Etiki" (Schoolchildren and Ethics), Izvestia, September 10, 1974, p. 6.

¹⁵ Pg. 25 "Role of Teachers in Ideological Education Stressed,"

¹⁶ MAJ-GEN Y. Gulinov, "Principles of the Development of the Soviet Armed Forces," Soviet Military Review, No. 3 (March, 1973), pp. 12-13.

¹⁷For succinct discussion of Soviet attitudes pertaining to foreign policy and war, see the following sources: Hoover, pp. 222-257; COL T. Kondratkov, "War as a Continuation of Policy," Soviet Military Review, No. 2 (February, 1974), pp. 7-9; A. Voronov, "Aims of Soviet Foreign Policy," Soviet Military Review, No. 3 (March, 1974), pp. 48-49.

¹⁸COL-GEN M. Kalashnik, "Political Education in the Soviet Armed Forces," Soviet Military Review, No. 10 (October, 1965), p. 16.

¹⁹For gaining an impression of what influences an inductee's state of mind by the time he enters the Soviet Armed Forces, see the following articles: "Advantages of Socialist Life to be Stressed in Propaganda," Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, XVIII, No. 9 (September 1974), pp. 24-25. Excerpt from "A Feeling of a Single Family," Radyans'ka Ukraina, June 18, 1974, p. 1; MAJ Y. Deryugin, "The Soviet Fighting Man's Spiritual World," Soviet Military Review, No. 12 (December, 1971), pp. 2-4; "Odessa Oblast Party Committee Holds Plenum on Ideology," Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, XVIII, No. 9 (September, 1974), pp. 2-3. Excerpt from "Raising the Effectiveness of Ideological Work Plenum of the Odessa Oblast Party Committee," Ratun in Radyans'ka Ukraina, July 21, 1974, p. 3; "Predvybornye Sobraniia Trudushchikhsia Krepit' Silu i Mogushchestvo Rodiny Vstrecha Ibiratelei s A. A. Grechko" (Election Campaign Meetings of the Working People: Make the Homeland Stronger and Mightier - Voters Meet with Andrei A. Grechko), Pravda, June 5, 1974, p. 2; "Radyans'ka Ukraina' Holds Conference on Political Education in Residential Locations," Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, XVIII, No. 10 (October, 1974), pp. 1-3. Excerpt from "To the Mind and Heart of Every Person. Meeting of Party Workers and Activists at an Editorial 'Round Table Conference on Mass Political Work Among workers at Their Places of Residence," Radyans'ka Ukraina, August 8, 1974, pp. 2-3; "Stress Importance of Ideological Tempering in Higher Schools," Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, XVIII, No. 5 (May, 1974), pp. 22-23. Excerpt from "The Frontiers of Higher Learning," Radyans'ka Ukraina, April 4, 1974, p. 1.

²⁰COL V. Kovalyov, "One for All and All for One," Soviet Military Review, No. 11 (November, 1974), p. 28.

²¹COL Y. Smirnov, "The Soldier and Politics," Soviet Military Review, No. 12 (December, 1973), p. 6.

²²Deryugin, p. 4. Also, see MAJ V. Gencharov, "Vospitanie Voli" (Instilling Determination), Voennyi Vestnik, No. 7, 1974, pp. 65-68.

²³GEN A. Yepishev, "Soviet Army's Historic Mission," Soviet Military Review, No. 2 (February, 1974), p. 5.

²⁴Marshal A. Grechko, "The Party, People, and Army Are One," Soviet Military Review, No. 5 (May, 1971), p. 3.

²⁵For discussion of the unification of ideology and psychology in the Soviet Armed Forces, see the following source: LTC B. Alekseev, "Eiinstvo Ideologicheskogo i Psikhologicheskogo v Vospitanii Voinov" (Unity of Ideology and Psychology in the Education of the Soldier), Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 24 (December, 1965), pp. 16-17.

²⁶For discussion of duty and mission within the Soviet Armed Forces, see the following sources: Yepishev, pp. 4-6; MAJ V. Amelchenko, "True and Mock Military Duty," Soviet Military Review, No. 7 (July, 1971), pp. 54-57.

²⁷For discussion of the necessity for political education in the Soviet Armed Forces, see the following source: Kalashnik, pp. 12-16.

²⁸LT-GEN I. Repin, "Tvoi Partiinyi Bilet" (Your Party Card), Voennii Vestnik, No. 9, 1974, p. 6.

²⁹MAJ Roland W. Flemming, Jr. and MAJ Ronald L. Gambolati, "Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces," Paper (Garmisch, Germany: U. S. Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, 1974). Appreciation is given to MAJ Gambolati for information concerning the Soviet political-military control apparatus. Annexes A, B, and C to this thesis reflect his efforts in synthesizing the functions and responsibilities of the GPU organization.

³⁰V. Lutsenko, "The Young Officer's Prestige," Soviet Military Review, No. 9 (September, 1973), pp. 20-21; LT-GEN A. Matveyenko, "Komandir-Organizator Boevoi i Politicheskoi Podgotovki" (The Commander-Organizer of Combat and Political Preparations), Voennii Vestnik, No. 4, 1974, pp. 62-64; "Squadron Political Worker," Soviet Military Review, No. 9 (September, 1971), p. 11. For discussion of the Commander/Officer, see the above sources.

³¹For discussion of the political officer, see the following sources: LT-CMDR L. Yakutin, "School of Political Workers," Soviet Military Review, No. 4 (April, 1974), pp. 31-32; COL V. Khobotov, "Company Political Worker," Soviet Military Review, No. 10 (October, 1971), pp. 55-56; V. Staritsyn, "A Political Worker's Talent," Soviet Military Review, No. 5 (May, 1973), pp. 24-25.

³²For discussion of the Komsomol organization and activities, see the following sources: "Komsomol Forum," Soviet Military Review, No. 5 (May, 1974), pp. 38-39; LTC A. Kurmanov, "I Komandir i Vospitatel'" (Both Commander and Indoctrinator), Voennii Vestnik, No. 9, 1974, pp. 67-71; CPT A. Novikov, "Boevoi Otriad Leninskogo Komsomola" (The Combat Detachment of the Lenin Komsomol), Voennii Vestnik, No. 4, 1974, pp. 65-69; Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers, translated by Peter Deriabin (New York: Avon Books, 1966), pp. 46-74; LT-GEN A. Figurnov, "Party Political Work in Combat Conditions," Soviet Military Review, No. 2 (February, 1972), pp. 43-45. Penkovskiy, in his memoirs, cites how his outstanding record in the Komsomol helped direct him into the careers of political officer and GPU. It seems logical that such a pattern would be a common practice within the Armed Forces.

³³See Annex A for a general description of the functions of the seven sections of the GPU organization. See Annex B for a chart of a typical GPU political-military control apparatus at regimental level. See Annex C for the responsibilities of the GPU political-military control apparatus.

³⁴Flemming, pp. 7-10; Penkovskiy, pp. 46-106.

³⁵COL A. Petrakov, "Efficiency," Soviet Military Review, No. 10 (October, 1973), p. 26. For additional discussion concerning essentiality of the collective, see the following sources: Alekseev, No. 24, 1965, pp. 15-23; MAJ L. Iakovishin, "Sluzhat Po Prisiuge, Po Sovesti" (They Serve by Oath and by Conscience), Voennyi Vestnik, No. 4, 1974, pp. 71-73; MAJ-GEN M. Popkov, "To Know Each Man," Soviet Military Review, No. 2 (February, 1974), pp. 30-31.

³⁶LT Y. Chernyshov, "School of Education," Soviet Military Review, No. 5 (May, 1973), pp. 46-47.

³⁷Ustav Vnutrennei Sluzhby Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR (Regulations of Garrison Duty of the Military Forces of the SSR) (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza SSR, 1971), p. 207. For discussion of oaths and allegiance, see COL A. Sidorov, "Educating the Men in Loyalty to the Oath of Allegiance," Soviet Military Review, No. 7 (July, 1974), pp. 24-25.

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⁴⁰For discussion of imposition of disciplinary measures within the Soviet Armed Forces, see the following sources: Distsiplinarnyi Ustav Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR (Disciplinary Regulations of the Armed Forces of the SSR) (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza SSSR, 1971); Kalashnik, No. 10, 1965, pp. 12-26; COL M. Korobeinikov, "The Soldier and the war," Soviet Military Review, No. 2 (February, 1973), pp. 28-29; CPT A. Skrylnik, "Discipline in the Armed Forces," Soviet Military Review, No. 9 (September, 1974), pp. 28-29+.

⁴¹Konstitutsiia--Osnovnoi Zakon--Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublikh (Constitution--the Basic Law--of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (Moskva: Ogiz, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1947), p. 20.

⁴²Scrutinization of the daily newspaper "Krasnaia Zvezda" (Red Star), for the period September 1 through December 31, 1974, revealed evidence of self-criticism within the Soviet Armed Forces. Compilation of pertinent material provided sufficient data to distinguish character deficiencies exhibited by the Soviet soldier.

⁴³"The Militia and Crime Among Youth," Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, XVIII, No. 12 (December, 1974), p. 3. Excerpt from "A Duty and a Vocation," Molod'Ukrainy, November 12, 1974, p. 3.

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